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Plaintiff SALVADOR CASTRO ("Castro"), on behalf of himself and the FLSA Class (as defined below and collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), alleges upon personal knowledge as to himself and his acts, and as to all other matters upon information and belief, as follows:

## I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. Defendant SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY is a publically owned company incorporated in Arizona. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC and SWIFT TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC are subsidiaries of SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and are Delaware limited liability companies (collectively "Swift"). Swift is a multi-faceted transportation services company and the largest truckload carrier in North America. Swift employs customer service representatives ("CSRs") to work with specific customers to ensure high-quality service and frequent customer contact. Although customer service representatives regularly work overtime, i.e., more than 40 hours in a week, Swift does not pay them premium overtime pay at the rate of time and one-half their regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.
- 2. Castro-brings this case under the collective action provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and a nationwide class of customer service representatives employed by Swift within three years of the filing of this Complaint who were not paid overtime premium pay at the rate of time and one-half the regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. He seeks unpaid wages, liquidated damages, interest, costs and attorneys' fees, as well as declaratory relief under the FLSA for himself and any customer service representatives who joins the action. 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
- 3. Castro also brings this case under California state law to recover overtime premium pay at the rate of time and one-half the regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek or more than eight hours in a day during the time period that commences four years prior to the filing of this action through the date of

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- judgment. Castro also seeks prejudgment interest, restitution, attorneys' fees and costs, injunctive relief, and other statutory penalties in violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., and the California Labor Code and related regulations, Cal Labor Code §§ 201-203, 218.6, 510, and 1194, Cal. Wage Order No. 4-2001.
- -Castro also brings claims for Swift's willful failure to pay all overtime compensation and other premium wages upon his termination. Castro seeks 30 days of wages, attorneys' fees and costs, prejudgment interest, and injunctive relief under California Labor Code §§ 203 and 218.6, and the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.
- 5. -Castro also brings this case to recover for meal and rest break violations, including one hour of additional pay at the regular rate of compensation for each workday that the proper meal and rest periods were not provided as secured by the California Labor Law, prejudgment interest, injunctive relief, and other statutory penalties for violations of California Labor Code and related regulations, Cal Labor Code §§ 218.6 and 226.7 and Cal. Wage Order No. 4-2001, and the California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.

## II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- The FLSA authorizes private rights of action to recover damages for 6. violation of the FLSA's wage and hour provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This Court has original federal question jurisdiction under 28 § U.S.C. § 1331 and by 28 U.S.C. § 1337 because this action arises under Acts of Congress regulating commerce. Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
- This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the California state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because they are so related to this action that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

- 1 8. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Swift 2 resides in Fontana, Mira Loma, and Wilmington, California, which lies within this District. 3
  - 9. Swift employs CSRs in this District including in Irwindale, Fontana, Mira Loma, and Wilmington, California.
- 6 10. Upon information and belief, Swift is subject to personal jurisdiction in California.
  - 11. A substantial part of the acts and/or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this District.

### III. THE PARTIES

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#### A. **Named Plaintiff**

- 12 12. Named Plaintiff Castro is a natural person residing in La Puente, California.
- 13 13. Castro was employed by Swift as a CSR from approximately November 2013 until approximately November 2014. 14
  - Castro worked for Swift as a CSR in Irwindale, California. 14.

#### B. Named Defendants

- 15. Upon information and belief, the individual Defendants are related business corporations having terminals and dedicated offices that employed CSRs in
- 19 California, and in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
- 20 Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
- Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 21
- 16. Defendant SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY is an Arizona 22
- 23 business corporation having an office and place of business in Phoenix, Arizona.
- 24 Defendant SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY lists its headquarters and
- 25 principal office address as 2200 S. 75th Ave., Phoenix, Arizona 85043-7410.
- 26 17. Defendant SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY is engaged in 27 interstate shipment of freight and provides its customers transportation solutions.
  - 18. Defendant SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC is a

- subsidiary of SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and is a Delaware limited 2 liability company. Upon information and belief, SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 3 CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC's headquarters and principal office address is 2200 S. 75th Ave., Phoenix, Arizona 85043-7410. 5 19. Defendant SWIFT TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC is a subsidiary of SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and is a Delaware limited liability company. Upon information and belief, SWIFT TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC's headquarters and principal office address is 2200 S. 75th Ave., Phoenix, Arizona 85043-7410. 10 20. Swift is a multi-faceted transportation services company and the largest truckload carrier in North America. 11 12 21. Swift conducts business throughout the country, including in Arizona, 13 California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 14 15 Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 22. 16 Upon information and belief, each individual Defendant grossed more than 17
  - \$500,000 in each of the last six calendar years, individually and collectively.
  - 23. Each individual Defendant is an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
- 20 24. The individual Defendants have common control and a common business purpose and are operated as a single enterprise, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 21 203(r)(1). 22
  - All actions and omissions described in this complaint were made by Swift directly or through its supervisory employees and agents.

### C. **Doe Defendants**

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26. Plaintiffs are ignorant about the true names of Defendants sued as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and their wrongful conduct, and therefore sue these Defendants by fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek Court leave to amend this

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complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained.

27. Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that at all relevant times, DOES 1-10, inclusive, were agents, servants, employees, representatives, partners, and related or affiliated entities of Defendants, and in doing the things hereinafter mentioned, were acting in the course and scope of their agency, employment, or retention with Defendants' permission, consent, authority and ratification.

# D. Represented Parties under 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b)

- 28. The term "FLSA Class" as used in this Complaint refers to Castro and a nationwide class of all customer service representatives employed by Swift who were scheduled to work more than 40 hours in a workweek and were not paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked over forty in a week within three years of the filing of this Complaint pursuant to the FLSA's collective action provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
- 29. Castro brings claims under the FLSA individually and for the FLSA Class to redress Swift's failure to pay wages at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked over forty in a week.
- 30. Excluded from the FLSA Class are Swift's legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who had at any time during the four years prior to the filing of the complaint, a controlling interest in Swift; the Judge(s) to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judges' immediate family; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the class. Also excluded from the FLSA Class are people whose claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Also excluded from the FLSA Class are those people who resolved their claims in *Flores v. Swift Transportation Company, et al.*, 2:14 Civ. 02900-AB-E (C.D. Cal) and the corresponding individual arbitrations.

## IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 2 | 31. Swift has employed CSRs throughout the country, in terminals located
- 3 || throughout the country, including in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
- 4 | Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,
- 5 Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
- 6 Wisconsin.

- 7 32. In California, Swift has employed CSRs in its terminals in Fontana, Lathrop,
- 8 Otay Mesa, Wilmington, and Willows.
- 9 33. Swift has also employed CSRs in dedicated offices throughout the United
- 10 || States.
- 11 34. Castro-worked for Swift in Irwindale, California as a CSR from
- 12 approximately November 2013 until approximately November 2014.
- 13 35. CSRs were assigned to process bills of lading for specific customers and to
- 14 keep those customers updated as to the progress of their freight.
- 15 36. Swift scheduled CSRs around the country, including Castro, to work more
- 16 than 40 hours in a workweek.
- 17 37. CSRs around the country, including Castro, regularly worked more than 40
- 18 hours in a workweek.
- 19 38. Castro was scheduled to work Monday thru Friday from 6:00 A.M. until
- 20 | 4:00 P.M.
- 21 39. As a result of the hours Swift scheduled Castro to work Monday thru Friday,
- 22 he worked at least 45 hours a week.
- 23 40. Castro-was scheduled to work approximately every third Saturday from 9:00
- 24 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. When Castro worked on a Saturday, he was scheduled to
- 25 work approximately 52 hours a week.
- 26 41. Swift paid CSRs, including Castro, on a salary basis.
- 27 42. CSRs, including <del>Castro,</del> were not paid overtime compensation at the rate of
- 28 time and one-half the regular rate for hours worked more than 40 in a workweek.

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- 43. Because of this uncompensated work, Swift failed to pay CSRs, including Castro, overtime premium pay at the rate of time and one-half the regular rate for hours worked more than 40 in a workweek as required by the FLSA.
- 44. Swift also failed to pay CSRs who worked in California, including Castro, overtime at the rate of time and one-half the regular rate for hours worked more than 40 in a workweek as required by California law.
- 45. Castro and other CSRs working in California regularly worked more than eight hours in a day.
- 46. Swift also failed to pay CSRs who worked in California, including <del>Castro</del>, overtime at the rate of time and one-half the regular rate for hours worked more than eight in a day as required by California law.
- 12 47. Swift knew or should have known that CSRs, including Castro, were working more than 40 hours a week.
- 48. Swift knew or should have known that CSRs, including Castro, were working more than eight hours a day.
  - 49. Castro worked for more than five consecutive hours without taking a 30 minute meal break as required by California law.
  - 50. Castro frequently worked for more than four consecutive hours without taking a rest break as required by California law.
  - 51. Upon arriving at work, Swift required CSRs, including Castro, to enter their employee number into the telephone at their workstation. CSRs, including Castro, were also required to enter a code into the telephone at the start of their shift, when they took a meal break, when they took a break, or when they were unavailable to make or receive telephone calls.
  - 52. The work status of each CSR at the terminal was displayed on a screen that other employees at the terminal could see, including whether the CSR was on a meal or rest break.
  - 53. Swift did not pay Castro his earned wages within 72 hours of his separation

from Swift.

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Swift did not pay Castro his earned wages within 30 days of his separation 54. from Swift.

Swift's conduct as described herein was willful and has caused significant damages to CSRs, including Castro.

56. In 1998 and 2002, the U.S. Department of Labor investigated Swift's overtime pay practices.

57. As of November 1, 2015, Swift reclassified CSRs as non-exempt under the FLSA.

## V. **CAUSES OF ACTION**

# FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Fair Labor Standards Act)

(Brought by Castro on behalf of himself and the nationwide FLSA Class)

- On information and belief, at all relevant times, each individual Defendant 58. was an "employer" engaged in interstate "commerce" and/or in the production of "goods" for "commerce," within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Swift employed CSRs, including Castro and the FLSA Class. Upon information and belief, each individual Defendant grossed more than \$500,000 in each of the last three calendar years.
- 59. Attached hereto, as Exhibit 1, is the consent to sue form signed by Castro in this action pursuant to section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 256. Other FLSA Class members will likely sign consent to sue forms and join as opt-in plaintiffs on this claim in the future.
- The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as Swift, to compensate all 60. non-exempt employees for all hours worked and overtime at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a workweek.
- CSRs were entitled to be paid compensation at the rate of one and one-half 61.

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Additionally, Castro is entitled to attorneys' fees, and costs, pursuant to

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California Labor Code, section 1194 and prejudgment interest, pursuant to California Labor Code § 218.6.

70. Wherefore, Castro requests relief as hereinafter prayed for.

# THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Failure to Provide Meal Periods)

- 71. Castro is entitled to an hour of pay for each day that Swift failed to afford one or more meal periods, in an amount according to proof.
- 72. Pursuant to California Labor Code, section 226.7, Castro seeks the payment of all meal period compensation which she is owed for the time period that commences four years prior to the filing of this action through the judgment date, according to proof.
- 73. Additionally, Castro is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs and prejudgment interest.
- 74. Wherefore, Castro requests relief as hereinafter prayed for.

# **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION** (Failure to Provide Rest Periods)

- 75. Castro is entitled to an hour of pay for each day that Swift failed to afford one or more rest periods, in an amount according to proof.
- 76. Pursuant to California Labor Code, section 226.7, Castro seeks the payment of all rest period compensation which she is owed for the time period that commences four years prior to the filing of this action through the judgment, according to proof.
- 77. Additionally, <del>Castro</del> is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs and prejudgment interest.
- 78. Wherefore, Castro requests relief as hereinafter prayed for.

# FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Failure to Pay Wages of Terminated or Resigned Employees)

79. Upon ending his employment with Swift, Castro was entitled to be promptly

paid lawful overtime compensation and other premiums, as required by California Labor Code, sections 201-203.

- 80. Pursuant to California Labor Code, section 203, Castro seeks the payment of penalties in the amount of up to 30 days of wages, according to proof.
- 81. Additionally, Castro is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to California Labor Code, section 203, and prejudgment interest, pursuant to California Labor Code § 218.6.
- 82. Wherefore, Castro requests relief as hereinafter prayed for.

## **SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

# (Violations of the Unfair Competition Law) (Brought by Plaintiff Castro)

- 83. The failure to pay lawful overtime compensation, and rest and meal period pay is an unlawful and unfair business practice within the meaning of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., including but not limited to a violation of the applicable State of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, regulations and statutes. It is a practice which is otherwise unfair and unlawful, because Swift did not pay tax contributions on the accrued overtime compensation in the form of FICA, Social Security, Medicare and Unemployment Insurance.
- 84. This cause of action is brought under Business and Professions Code §§ 17203 and 17204, commonly called the Unfair Competition Law. Under this cause of action and pursuant to Business and Professions Code § 17208, Castro seeks restitution of overtime wages and rest and meal period pay owed and where applicable, the penalties which are provided under the California Labor Code § 203, where such wages and penalties were due, commencing four (4) years prior to filing of this complaint, according to proof.
- 85. This cause of action is brought as a cumulative remedy as provided in Business and Professions Code § 17205 and is intended as an alternative remedy for restitution for Castro for the time period, or any portion thereof, commencing

- 86. As a result of Swift's unlawful and unfair business practice of failing to pay overtime and prompt payment of wages in violation of the California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202, Castro has suffered damages and are entitled to restitution in an amount according to proof and injunctive relief pursuant to Business and Professions Code § 17203.
- 87. Further, Castro requests Swift's violations alleged herein be enjoined, and other equitable relief as this Court deems proper including payment for all hours worked and requiring and furnishing rest and meal periods and requiring payment by Swift of tax contributions on the accrued overtime compensation in the form of FICA, Social Security, Medicare, Unemployment Insurance, or other appropriate payments.
- 88. Wherefore, Castro requests relief as hereinafter prayed for.

## VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Castro, and the FLSA Class he seeks to represent, pray for relief and request that this Court enter an Order:

- 1. Declaring that Swift violated the FLSA;
- 2. Ordering notice sent to the class of all CSRs employed by Swift within three years of the filing of this Complaint and giving them notice of the opportunity to join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);
- 3. Certifying this action as a collective action;
- 4. Declaring that Swift's violations of the FLSA were willful;
- 5. Granting judgment to Castro and the FLSA Class for their claims of unpaid wages as secured by the FLSA, as well as an equal amount in liquidated damages and interest; and

1	6. Awarding Castro and the FLSA Class their costs, including expert witness		
2	fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees.		
3	With respect to the California state law claims:		
4	a. Declaring that Swift violated the overtime pay, meal and rest break,		
5	and wage payment provisions of the California Labor Law;		
6	b. Declaring that Swift's violations of the California Wage Payment		
7	provisions of the California Labor Codes were willful;		
8	c. Declaring that Swift violated the California Unfair Competition Law;		
9	d. Granting judgment to Castro for his claims of unpaid overtime wages		
10	as secured by the California Labor Law, as well as prejudgment interest;		
11	e. Granting judgment to Castro for his claims of 30 days wages as		
12	secured by the California Labor Law;		
13	f. Granting judgment to Castro for his claim of one hour of additional		
14	pay at the regular rate of compensation for each workday that the proper meal		
15	periods were not provided, and one hour of additional pay at the regular rate of		
16	compensation for each workday that the proper rest period was not provided as		
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1	g. Granting judgr	g. Granting judgment to Castro for his claim of restitution and injunctive		
2	relief as secured by the California Unfair Competition Law;			
3	h. Any other appr	n. Any other appropriate statutory penalties, other injunctive and		
4	equitable relief as the Court may deem just and proper, and post-judgment interest			
5	and			
6	i. Awarding <del>Cast</del>	Awarding Castro his attorneys' fees and costs of suit, including exper		
7	fees and costs.			
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9	Dated: May 11, 2016	Pagnogtfully gubmitted		
10	Dated. May 11, 2010	Respectfully submitted,		
11		SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS & HOFFMAN LLP		
12		CEEDALAN O CAMPIDADA DAY C		
13		GETMAN & SWEENEY, PLLC		
14		By: /s/ Aidan C. McGlaze		
15		Aidan C. McGlaze		
16		Attorneys for Plaintiff		
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Collective Action Complaint